In this paper, we measure currency carry trade funding risk using stock market volatility and crash risk in Japan, the main funding currency country. We show that the measures of funding risk in Japan can explain 42% of the monthly currency carry trade returns during our sample period, 2000-2011. In addition, they explain 46% of the monthly foreign exchange volatility in our sample of ten main currencies, 28% of the speculators' net currency futures positions in Australian dollar versus Japanese yen, skewness in currency returns and currency crashes. We present a theoretical model that is consistent with these findings.
The finance literature has confirmed the importance of funding constraints for asset pricing, supporting the theoretical research in Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Gromb In addition, we demonstrate the importance of funding risk, i.e. the degree of time variation in funding constraints, in explaining several currency market related phenomena.
Again following the same logic, we use equity market risks in Japan as proxies for carry traders' funding risk. In particular, our two proxies for funding risk are the option implied volatility and crash risk in the Japanese stock market, estimated following the approach in Santa-Clara and Yan (2010). These measures of funding risk for Japan can explain as much as 42% of monthly carry trade returns during our sample period 2000-2011. In addition, they explain 46% of the monthly currency volatility against USD for the average currency in our sample.
We have several additional results that highlight the importance of funding risk. We show for instance that the same equity market risks in Japan can explain a large fraction of the time variation in the monthly currency correlations between carry trade investment and funding currencies (e.g. 23% of the time variation in the correlation between Australian dollar and Japanese yen). In addition, our measures of funding risk can explain skewness in currency returns (particularly for the carry trade investment currencies), as well as currency crash risk. They can also explain speculators' trading activity: our measure of funding risk in Japan alone explains 28% of the time variation in the net currency futures positions of noncommercial traders in Australian dollar and Japanese yen at the Commodity Futures Trading Commission in US. Moreover it is really the funding-currencies equity market risk that matters, not the global equity market risks in general. We stress this result by showing that the funding risk in Japan (or even the funding risk in another funding country, Switzerland) makes the same measures for US redundant, in regressions explaining carry trade returns.
Our empirical results bridge several earlier findings presented in the literature related to currency carry trade returns and currency market volatility, by showing linkages between funding conditions (as discussed in Brunnermeier, Nagel and Pedersen, 2009) for speculators, the volatility in the currency market (as described in Menkho § et al., 2012) , and currency crash risk (see e.g. Jurek, 2009; Ichiue and Koyama, 2011) . Our research provides support for those earlier papers, which argue that the historical returns on currency carry trading reflect limited speculative capital. Furthermore, our results complement the earlier literature linking equity and foreign exchange markets (see for instance Hau and Rey, 2005; Korajczyk and Viallet, 1992 ).
On a broader scope, our paper is related to previous work on the importance of "peso problems" for understanding abnormal returns. Even if market crashes fail to materialize in-sample, it is possible to use forward-looking option prices to estimate implied risk in the underlying security and thus measure investors' expectations of such events. Along these lines, Santa-Clara and Yan (2010) use S&P500 options to estimate US equity market implied risk, and they find support for the peso explanation of the equity premium puzzle. Here we show that these measures of implied risk in the equity market of a carry trade fundingcurrency country can explain carry trade returns, therefore also supporting a risk-based explanation for the forward premium puzzle.
To provide structure for our empirical investigation, we set up a stylized model that extends the currency carry trade model presented in Jylhä and Suominen (2011) . In our model there are two countries, whose nominal fixed income securities o §er di §erent returns due to di §erences in the two countries' investors' per capita inflation risk. When the correlation between the two countries' inflation risk is high and the number of investors that can engage in international fixed income transactions is small, speculators engage in carry trading. In our model, similarly as in and Gromb and Vayanos (2002) , speculators face funding constraints. In addition, we assume that there is time variation in the level of funding constraints, causing funding risk. Our model is consistent with the empirical findings discussed above.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section I we present our stylized model. Section II describes the data and Section III discusses the estimation of currency carry trade returns and funding risk. In Section IV we present our empirical findings, while Section V concludes the paper.
I. The Model

A. Setup
Our model builds upon Jylhä and Suominen (2011) . We assume that there are two countries {i, j}, each with N citizens where N is normalized to one. The citizens produce and consume a single commodity and use money in the production of this commodity. We also assume that country i0s production function generates f (m i,t ) goods in period t + 1, where m i,t denotes agents' real money holdings of country i's currency in period t. The production function takes the logarithmic form f (m i,t ) = A i,t ln(m i,t ), where A i,t denotes the stochastic marginal productivity, known to the agents at time t. The marginal productivity, in turn, follows an autoregressive process of the AR (1) form:
where A and  A are positive constants and
The purchasing power of country i's money in period t is denoted by  i,t , so that M i units of country i's currency have a real purchasing power of m i,t = M i  i,t . Agents choose their optimal real money holdings given information available at time t, allowing us to endogenously determine the parameters of the conditional distribution of  i,t in equilibrium.
Besides money, there are two other storage technologies in each country. First there is a risk-free asset with real return r f in perfectly elastic supply. Second, there is a one-period default-free zero coupon bond, sold at a real market price p i,t , that pays one unit of country i's nominal currency at time t+1. The risk in this asset comes from the uncertain purchasing power of money in period t + 1. Both countries' risky assets are in zero net supply. , we assume that all consumers first hedge their money holdings in the bond market, and only then look at their bond investments. In this case, the e §ective supply of bonds, denoted in country i's currency, is country i's money supply M i .
We assume overlapping generations of myopic agents, who live for two periods, invest when they are young and consume when they are old. Before dying, they sell their money holdings to the next generation of agents. Period t investors value their next period consumption c t+1 using a CARA-utility function, u (c t+1 ) = E t e ac t+1 , where a denotes risk aversion. Furthermore, let us denote by b i,t the quantity of country i's nominal zero coupon bonds, with a face value of one, that an agent purchases (or sells) in period t (in addition to his short position in country i's bonds, that comes from hedging his currency holdings).
Similarly, let b j,t refer to purchases of country j's bonds.
We assume that the financial markets are segmented: a fraction (1  k i ) > 0 of country i's investors have prohibitively high transaction costs of investing abroad, i.e. to hold money or interest bearing securities in a foreign currency. Fraction k i of country i's investors, on the other hand, are unrestricted. We call the restricted investors "domestic investors"
and the unrestricted ones "speculators". To keep the model parsimonious, in contrast to
Jylhä and Suominen (2011), we take the number of speculators as given. 3 Our second point of departure from Jylhä and Suominen (2011) is to assume that investors face borrowing constraints, as in Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) and Gromb and Vayanos (2002) . The main innovation in our model, however, is to assume time variation in the severity of the borrowing constraints. We assume that the borrowing constraint for country i bonds at time t is given by b i,t  h i,t , with h i,t > 0. Furthermore, evaluated at time t, the next period's borrowing constraint is random:
where h and  h are positive constants and
Without loss of generality, we assume  A =  h = . Given condition (2), in our model the investors face not only funding constraints, but also funding risk. In contrast to the financial markets, there are no barriers in the product market.
Therefore, assuming that period t investors are endowed with a real wealth w t at the beginning of period t, country i's speculators at time t maximize:
where E t refers to the expectation operator conditional on time t information set. The domestic investors in country i, in turn, solve the following optimization problem:
M ax
s.t.
(4)
Equilibrium prevails when each agent's action maximizes his expected utility. Finally, note that country i's citizens do not benefit from country j's currency in their production activities.
B. The Equilibrium
B.1. Equilibrium Conditions
Since there are no restrictions in the product market, purchasing power parity (PPP) implies that the period t exchange rate (at which country j's currency can be exchanged to country i's currency) is given by S j,i t =  j,t / i,t . We will for the moment assume that the borrowing constraints do not bind for the domestic investors. We later verify this assumption. Now, 
Taking expectations and the first order condition of (4) with respect to domestic investors' bond holdings b d i,t , and using the market clearing condition b
, we obtain that the price of the zero coupon bond, p i,t , in country i at time t is:
where
) denotes the variance of the purchasing power of country i's currency (conditional on time t information). Moreover, recall that f (m i,t ) = A i,t ln(m i,t ). Taking the first order condition of (3) and (4) with respect to m i,t and, using it together with condition (6), implies:
From conditions (6) and (7), the exchange rate can now be stated as a function of the two countries zero-coupon bond prices:
and the Sharpe ratio for the real returns on bond investments is:
These results show that the Sharpe ratio on bond investments is increasing in the parameter of risk aversion a, inflation risk  i , and the per capita supply of bonds in the domestic
In the case of an autarky, where k i and k j are zero,
, where M i is the local money supply. In such perfectly segmented markets, the Sharpe ratio for bonds is higher in the country with the higher per capita inflation risk, M i  i . Let us denote by H the country with the higher per capita inflation risk and by L the country with the lower per capita inflation risk. In the case of autarkies, the higher Sharpe ratio in country H, as compared to country L, is necessary to attract su¢cient investment into the risky bonds of country H, clearing the market despite the higher amount of risk being sold.
Let us now look at the speculators' problem. Taking the first order condition of (3) with respect to the speculators' investment into country i's bonds, b s i,t , implies:
where   corr t ( i,t+1 ,  j,t+1 ) equals the correlation between the two countries' purchasing power, and  denotes the Lagrangian multiplier, so that  i,t  0 and
Again, the i and j sub-indices refer to the currency in which the investment is made. There is no superscript for countries, as the speculators from both countries make similar investments.
Using (5) and (6) in (10), we can now solve for the equilibrium bond holdings.
B.2. Solving for the Equilibrium
The higher Sharpe ratio in country H's bonds implies that speculators are always long in these bonds. Therefore the borrowing constraint is potentially binding only for country L bonds. We then characterize our economy in two states: 1) the borrowing constraints do not bind and 2) the speculators' borrowing constraint in country L is binding.
Case 1: Borrowing constraint is not binding The equilibrium is the same as in Jylhä and Suominen (2011). 4 Solving the set of equations above, we obtain that, in equilibrium, all speculators hold identical portfolios:
of country i's bonds, while the domestic investors hold:
of such bonds. The asterisk is used to denote an equilibrium value. Using (12) in equations (6) and (9) gives us an easy characterization of the equilibrium bond prices and Sharpe ratios in our economy.
Note from (12) that, in both countries, the supply of bonds that domestic investors hold is strictly positive (therefore verifying our earlier assumption that domestic investors are long in bonds) and implying also positive Sharpe ratios. Note also from (11) that, in equilibrium, the speculators are indeed always long in country H's bonds. Moreover, if  is
, the speculators are short the country L bonds, thus engaging in a carry trade. For the remainder of the paper, we will assume
Case 2: Borrowing constraint in country L is binding For su¢ciently low h and su¢ciently low  h , it is easy to show that there exists a constrained equilibrium where the speculators' borrowing constraint in country L is binding and speculators still enter into a carry trade. 5 In such an equilibrium, using conditions (7) and (10), we have:
which, together with condition (6), implies:
) 
C. Model Predictions
In the previous subsection, we characterized the equilibrium in the cases of binding and non-binding borrowing constraints. We now turn to the model implications, in terms of the e §ect of funding conditions and funding risk on exchange rates and speculators' activity.
C.1. Exchange Rate Volatility and Correlations
Hypothesis 1: When the borrowing constraint is binding, exchange rate volatility is higher. In addition, higher funding risk,  h , leads to higher currency volatility.
Given the structure of the shocks in the model, we conjecture and verify that the purchasing power  also follows an auto-regressive process and thus its conditional expectation depends on the current value according to
6 Using condition (7), we can therefore determine  i and  ,i as functions of the underlying parameters. In the case of the non-binding borrowing constraint, this implies:
, ( 1 5 ) where U denotes the unconstrained equilibrium, and
Given that condition (7) also holds for both countries in the case where the constraints are binding, similar arguments yield:
where:
)
Here C denotes the constrained equilibrium. Using these conditions for the purchasing power, we can calculate the corresponding variances (conditional on time t information) for the non-binding case:
and for the binding case:
Equation (20) shows that the volatilities of the two countries exchange rates with respect to the risk-free asset are higher in the constrained case. In addition, they increase with  h .
As we show below, the correlation between the two countries purchasing power is lower in the constrained equilibrium and it decreases with  h . This implies that also the volatility of the exchange rate between carry-short and carry-long currencies, S
L,H t
, is higher in the constrained equilibrium and it increases with the funding risk  h .
Hypothesis 2: When the borrowing constraint is binding, the correlation between purchasing power in carry-long and -short countries is lower. In addition, higher funding risk,  h , decreases this correlation. Using conditions (15) and (17) above, we can calculate how the correlation between the two countries' purchasing power varies between the unconstrained and constrained equilibria and, in the latter case, how it varies with funding risk. For the unconstrained equilibrium, we have:
while, for the constrained equilibrium, it can be shown that:
and therefore  C <  U . Thus, the correlation between carry-long and -short currencieswhere each currency is measured vis-a-vis the risk-free asset -decreases with tightening of borrowing constraints. Moreover condition (22), along with condition (20) , shows that  C is decreasing in funding risk,  2 h .
C.2. Skewness and Currency Crashes
Hypothesis 3: Tightening of funding conditions are associated with exchange rate skewness and currency crashes We characterized above both the unconstrained and constrained equilibria. To simplify the analysis, we always ignored the possibility of switches between the two regimes. It is di¢cult to fully characterize the equilibrium in the region where the probability of funding constraints being binding is strictly between zero and one. Nevertheless, to illustrate the possibility of currency crashes, let us for the moment assume that agents are naïve and assume that, in the region where the funding constraints are binding (not binding) they will remain binding (not binding) also in the next period.
Under these assumptions, we are able to explicitly show what happens in the region where there is a regime switch such that the funding constraints start to bind, i.e., in the region
Using equations (16) and (18), it can be shown that there is a decline in both  L and  H when h L,t decreases below the critical level. This occurs as the higher variances of currencies and their lower correlation lead a) to unwinding of carry trades given (13) , namely a decline in b s H , and b) to an increase in the currency risk premium, due to the higher currency variability as can be seen from conditions (16) and (18) . The currency crash is depicted in Figure 1 .
[ Figure 1 here] Note that our model also makes predictions on currency skewness. In the region where the constraints are not binding, the exchange rate fluctuations are smaller, given (20) , therefore leading to skewness in currency returns. In addition, the sign of the skewness for the investment currencies is negative, while, due to the currency crash at the point of the switch of the regime, the sign of skewness for the funding currencies (relative to the risk free asset) is undetermined.
C.3. Speculative Activity and Currency Carry Trade Returns
Hypothesis 4: The level of funding conditions and funding risk a §ect speculators' positions It is clear from the equations in (13) that the level of funding conditions in country L, h L , directly a §ects the amount of country L bonds that speculators can short.
In addition, it a §ects the amount of speculators' investment in country H. Moreover, in the region where the constraint is binding, conditions (13) and (22) imply that the funding risk,  h , reduces speculative investment in currency H, therefore leading to unwinding of long-side carry trades. Both e §ects confirm hypothesis 4.
Hypothesis 5: Tightening of funding constraints, or an increase in funding risk, is associated with poor carry trade returns Given conditions (13) and the fact that condition (22) Starting with daily data on the di §erent stock index options, we first apply a similar filtering process as Santa-Clara and Yan (2010). We drop contracts with missing data; maturity is restricted to be longer than 10 days and shorter than 1 year; we keep only options with moneyness (i.e. stock price divided by the strike price) between 0.85 and 1.15; cases with open interest of fewer than 100 contracts are excluded (except for ASX200
B. Stock Market Options Data
options, for which this information is mostly non-available); we use only put options and apply option parity to obtain the corresponding call prices; contracts that have too low prices are excluded 7 ; cases that imply option mispricing (i.e. violation of boundary conditions) are also dropped. For the remaining sample, we calculate Black-Scholes implied volatilities and delete those contracts for which this value cannot be determined. In Appendix, Table A.1 shows the mean implied volatilities, as well as the numbers of option contracts for each market.
III. Modeling Carry Trade Returns and Funding Risk
In this section, we first present the carry trade strategy and associated returns for di §erent portfolio constructions. Second, we estimate stock market volatility and jump intensity for selected countries using data on the respective stock market option indices. We later argue that these measures are good indicators of funding risk in those countries' currencies.
A. The Returns to Currency Carry Trade
The carry trade investor borrows in low interest rate currencies and invests in high interest rate currencies, thus making positive expected returns due to the failure of the uncovered interest rate parity. The carry trade can also be implemented using forward exchange rate contracts (see for example Galati et al., 2007) . Following this latter approach, we calculate monthly returns using one-month forward rates. We first sort currencies according to their forward discounts 8 , and then borrow (invest in) the currency with the smallest (largest) forward discount. We denote this long-short strategy by HmL (High-minus-Low). Typically Japanese yen and Swiss franc are considered the standard "funding currencies", while
Australian and New Zealand dollars are considered the two major "investment currencies".
Therefore a very popular strategy among investors consists of going short the Japanese yen and going long the Australian dollar. We consider this strategy, which we denote by AU mJP (Australian dollar minus Japanese yen), and present its return over time on Figure 2 .
[ Figure 2 here]
For robustness purposes, we also consider two alternative strategies: going long (short)
in the three currencies with the three largest (smallest) forward discounts (HmL3); going long (short) in the five currencies with the five largest (smallest) forward discounts (HmL5). Table I shows the summary statistics of the monthly returns on these carry trade port- [ Table I 
B.2. Our Measure of Funding Risk
We use index option data to estimate stock market risk (both di §usion and jump components)
as it is perceived ex ante by investors. Our goal is to relate these measures, estimated for both long and short carry countries, with exchange rate dynamics and speculators' activity.
For this purpose, we focus on four markets: the US (the benchmark currency), Australia (a typical 'investing currency', in which investors go long) 9 , as well as Japan and Switzerland (the typical 'funding currencies', commonly shorted by speculators).
We follow Santa-Clara and Yan (2010) and model stochastic volatility as a Brownian motion and the jump risk as a Poisson process, which is assumed to have stochastic intensity.
In particular, for each of the four countries above, the dynamics of the stock market index S is modeled as follows:
Here r is the constant risk-free interest rate. The di §usive variance of the stock return of a European call option with strike price K and maturity date T (e.g. Lewis, 2000) .
We apply Santa-Clara and Yan (2010) quasi-maximum likelihood approach 11 and estimate the model for each country every week, using data for the stock index and four put option contracts {S t , P [ Table II here]
Our US estimates are consistent with those obtained by Santa-Clara and Yan (2010), but we do find higher average volatility most likely due to the financial crisis period. Moreover, although volatility and jump intensity are correlated within and across countries, they still display di §erent behavior over time, as illustrated by Figure 3 .
10 Applying Ito's lemma, one can find the processes for V and . The drift and covariance terms will not be linear in the state variables, making it a linear-quadratic jump-di §usion model. 11 The estimation approach is described in detail in their paper, so we omit the details here. We also thank the authors for kindly making their estimation code available.
12 P 1 t and P 2 t have the shortest maturity (greater than 15 days and as close as possible to 30 days), P 
IV. Empirical Findings
We now turn to testing the five hypotheses regarding the relation between funding risk, exchange rates, and speculators' activity. Given the importance of Japanese financial conditions to carry trade funding liquidity discussed above, we use the volatility and jump intensity estimated from stock options in Japan as our measures of funding risk. As the next sections will show, these measures perform striking well in explaining currency dynamics, speculators' activity, and carry trade returns. Moreover they outperform common measures of funding risk used in the literature, such as the TED spread. They also prove robust to the inclusion of a simple index of financial sector equity performance in Japan. Finally, very similar results are obtained with the measures calculated from stock options in Switzerland, therefore confirming the important role of the low-yield currencies.
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A. Explaining FX Volatility and Correlations with Funding Risk
Hypotheses 1 and 2 in Section I.C predict that increased funding risk leads to higher variability in both funding and investing currencies, as well as to a lower correlation between carry-short and carry-long currencies.
To test Hypothesis 1, we use a monthly measure of exchange rate volatility. For each currency, we calculate the standard deviation of daily currency returns (i.e. the symmetric of daily exchange rate changes against the USD) over the last month. The monthly measure of currency volatility, denoted by F X  , is calculated as the average of the individual standard deviations. We then regress the log of the average volatility on the funding risk in 13 The unreported results for Switzerland are available upon request.
for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in the monthly regression residuals, we report Newey-West standard errors. Table III presents the results. The estimated coe¢cients are positive, confirming that currency volatility is increasing in funding risk.
[ Table III here]
As Table III shows, the volatility and crash risk in the Japanese stock market alone explain, on average, a staggering 46% of monthly currency volatility. Table III also includes alternative measures of funding risk commonly used in the literature. In particular we consider the TED spread (measured as the di §erence between the 3-months LIBOR dollar rate and the 3-months T-Bill rate) and we find that it performs significantly worse than the Japanese crash risk. As a robustness test, and motivated by the empirical evidence discussed in subsection B.1, we also include the Japanese financial sector stock index in the regression.
The financial sector equity prices in Japan can explain 19% of the currency volatility and they remain statistically significant in all regression specifications. Hypothesis 1 is therefore validated in the data.
Hypothesis 2 is also confirmed by our empirical results. In order to show it, we calculate the correlation coe¢cient between our investing (or 'long') currency, Australian dollar, and our funding (or 'short') currency, Japanese yen. As above, the correlation is calculated monthly (using daily data over the previous month) and we then regress it on our monthly average measures of funding risk. As can be seen from Table IV, the estimated coe¢cient for crash risk is negative and the corresponding adjusted R 2 is 23%, confirming our hypothesis that the correlation between investing and funding currencies decreases when funding conditions tighten. 14 We also tried two alternative specifications: (i) using daily data on exchange rates, we calculated volatility over the previous week and then performed weekly regressions of F X  on funding risk; (ii) again using daily data, we calculated volatility over the previous month, and then performed rolling weekly regressions. All three alternatives deliver similar conclusions, but the specification shown is preferred as it is less noisy than (i) and avoids potential issues with the overlapping data used in (ii).
[ Table IV here]
B. Explaining Currency Crashes and Skewness with Funding Risk
The cross-section di §erences in currency skewness are well-known in the literature. Consistent with previous work, we also find that average skewness is positive and highest for Japanese yen (the main carry trade funding currency), while negative and lowest for Australian and New Zealand dollars (the main carry trade investing currencies).
In our model, if the funding constraints do not bind, the currency variability is smaller.
When funding constraints start binding, as depicted in Figure 1 , there is first a currency crash in both the funding and investment currencies. Any further tightening of funding constraints, in turn, leads to further depreciation of the investment currencies but an appreciation of the funding currencies. Given these e §ects, our model predicts that the currency returns are negatively skewed for the investment currencies, but not necessarily so for the funding currencies. Therefore, let us investigate if countries' di §erent exposures to funding risk help to explain the cross-sectional di §erences in exchange rate skewness. Following In addition, our model predicts that a strong tightening of credit conditions is associated with crashes of the investment currencies and large appreciations of the funding currencies.
To test these predictions in the data, we estimate a probit model where the dependent variable is the crash currency likelihood. We start by constructing a carry portfolio, that holds the long-carry currency (AUD) and shorts the low-yield currency (JPY), and we calculate its return against a basket of six non carry-currencies during that month. The dependent variable takes value 1 if there is a crash in this portfolio (defined as a negative return lower than minus one standard deviation on a given month) and 0 otherwise. The results are presented in Table V , where we show that increases in funding crash risk  indeed lead to a higher likelihood of currency crashes. As before, we also present the results for the TED spread with very similar conclusions. Therefore Hypothesis 3 is confirmed empirically.
[ Table V Table VI shows the results from regressing speculative activity on funding risk, for both individual currencies involved in carry trades and the long-short position (long AUD/short JPY).
[ Table VI 
C.2. Carry Trade Returns
We now turn to the e §ect of funding risk on currency carry trade returns. We follow the common procedure in the literature and decompose the e §ect of both the di §usive volatility and the crash likelihood into expected and unexpected components. An analysis of the partial autocorrelations of each weekly time series shows that they are best modeled with three autoregression lags, as the shocks extracted in this way seem to be serially uncorrelated.
In particular, we fit an AR (3) as, due to the slow moving capital (e.g. see Du¢e, 2010) , the market reaction may be slow (lagged residuals of volatility are not statistically significant and therefore are omitted). As expected, we obtain positive coe¢cients on the fitted values and negative estimates for the residuals. Table VII presents the results for the di §erent carry trade portfolios, using stock market related risks in Japan.
[ Table VII here]
Noting the very high R 2 's of the regressions, it is clear that funding risk in carry-short countries has a remarkably high explanatory power for carry trade returns, thus validating Hypothesis 5. 17 Moreover, we note that the funding-country equity market risks have a more important e §ect than the same factors calculated from the US market. 18 For instance, the R 2 of the regression of HmL returns on US equity market volatility and crash risk is below 24%, substantially lower than the fit of 36% found for the case of Japan. This point is further stressed in Table VIII , where we include both Japanese and US measures. First, the predictive power of funding risk for carry trade returns is stronger for the case of Japan.
Second, in a full regression, only the Japanese measures remain statistically significant. Both conclusions also hold when considering Switzerland as the funding country. 17 As a robustness check, Table A .2 in Appendix shows the same results for the Switzerland funding risk measures. 18 During the period under study, the US interest rate levels are both below the median level (in the early 2000's and after 2008) as well as above the median level (between late 2004 and 2008). Therefore the role of the US dollar as either a funding or investing currency has changed over time.
Overall the inclusion of other measures of funding risk, such as the TED spread or VIX, does not a §ect the statistical significance of the stock market risks in the funding currencies. 19 Very similar conclusions confirming the robustness of our results are obtained using the US stock returns, the Japanese financial sector index, or the innovations in global FX volatility (as in Menkho § et al., 2012).
[ Table VIII here]
V. Conclusion
In this paper we develop a new measure of funding risk, allowing us to confirm the importance of funding constraints in currency speculation, therefore extending the results in Brunnermeier, Nagel, and Pedersen (2009). We measure funding risk for carry trades using the equity options' implied stock market volatility and crash risk in Japan, the most typical carry trade funding country. This measure seems to be a good proxy for speculators' ability in obtaining funds for carry trading, as it has a remarkably strong explanatory power for currency carry trade returns and speculators' trading activity. Developing a stylized model of currency carry trades that allows for funding risk, we are able to make several new predictions regarding currency speculation and its e §ect on exchange rates. In particular, in our model, a deterioration of funding conditions for speculators leads to a regime switch from the unconstrained to the constrained economy. This switch brings about higher exchange rate volatility, lower correlation between investing and funding currencies, causes negative skewness for investing currencies, and currency crashes.
In addition, the associated unwinding of carry trades causes poor returns to currency carry traders. We find that these predictions are all supported by the data. the country exposures to funding risk and average currency skewness. The exposures to funding risk are the estimated coe¢cient from a regression of individual monthly currency returns on the monthly average Japanese crash risk. All the coe¢cients in these individual regressions are statistically significant at one percent level, with the exception of CHF, DKK, and EUR (corresponding to the unfilled markers). For the currency skewness, we use daily exchange rate returns within (overlapping) quarterly time periods, and then take the time-series average. The line shows the fitted values of regressing currency skewness on country exposures, and the corresponding fit is 51%. Table III Exchange Rate Volatility and Funding Risk
This table shows the explanatory power of funding risk in Japan for the average monthly log currency standard deviation, denoted by ln(F X  ). For each currency in the sample of ten developed countries, the volatility is calculated monthly using the daily exchange rate changes against USD.  and  are the monthly average volatility and jump likelihood, computed from stock option data in Japan. Model (1) shows that the funding risk measures in Japan alone, in particular crash risk, are able to explain 46% of FX volatility. Models (2) and (3) show that alternative measures of funding risk, such as the TED spread or the Japanese financial index (JP Fin.), perform significantly worse in explaining currency volatility. Model (4) This table shows the explanatory power of crash risk for the correlation coe¢cient between the main long currency (Australian Dollar) and the main short currency (Japanese Yen). The correlation coe¢cient is calculated monthly, using the daily exchange rate changes against USD.  and  are the monthly average volatility and jump likelihood, computed from stock option data in the Japanese market. Model (1) shows that the funding risk measures in Japan alone, in particular crash risk, are able to explain 23% of currency correlation. Models (2) and (3) show the results for alternative measures of funding risk, the Japanese financial index (JP Fin.) and the commonly used TED spread. The Japanese financial sector index is obtained from Datastream and divided by 100 for expositional purpose. Model (4) shows the regression results when including all measures. The t-statistics shown in the second column are computed using NeweyWest standard errors (with a lag of five months). ** (*) shows statistical significance at 1 (5) percent. The 'carry portfolio' consists on holding the long-carry currency (AUD) and shorting the low-yield currency (JPY), and we calculate its return against a basket of six currencies (which does not include the investment or the funding currencies) during that month. We define a crash when the portfolio return is lower than (minus) 1 standard deviation. In Model (1), we show that changes in funding risk estimated from Japanese stock options data (), both contemporaneous and lagged, can explain 27% of currency crash. Model (2) considers the same type of regression for the TED spread. Model (3) shows the result when including only contemporaneous changes and Model (4) considers all variables. Contemporaneous and lagged changes of the Japanese financial sector index or stochastic volatility are not statistically significant, so they are excluded here. The z-statistics are computed using robust standard errors and ** (*) shows statistical significance at 1 (5) percent. The last row shows pseudo-R 2 s. 
Implied Volatilities across Markets
This table shows the Black-Scholes implied volatilites for all options. The first column for each country presents the average implied volatility and the second column the corresponding standard deviation. Results are shown for di §erent levels of moneyness and time to maturity. The first column shows the three classes of moneyness considered, where "Low" corresponds to S/K < 0.95, "Mid" corresponds to 0.95 < S/K < 1.05, and "High" corresponds to S/K > 1.05. The second column refers to time to maturity measured in days. The last row shows the number of option contracts (after filtering) and the number of trading days for each market. the time-series of the monthly net interbank assets of foreign banks in Japan, measured as call loans minus call money and expressed in percentage of the total financial assets of those banks. Similarly, the aggregate net intero¢ce accounts (Panel B) is measured as the asset minus liabilities intero¢ce components, expressed as a percentage of total financial assets of those banks. The data is available from Bank of Japan. Over our sample period, the correlation coe¢cient between the two series is -65.10%. This strongly negative relation is in line with the findings in Hattori and Shin (2009) , and can be interpreted as evidence that the Japan o¢ces of the foreign banks are channeling yen liquidity out of Japan. The aggregate net intero¢ce accounts of foreign banks in Japan is measured as the asset minus liabilities intero¢ce components (available from Bank of Japan), expressed as a percentage of total financial assets of those banks. Over our sample period, the correlation coe¢cient between the net future positions in JPY and the net intero¢ce accounts is -51.54%. For illustration purposes, the plot shows the symmetric of the net intero¢ce accounts (a positive value implies that foreign banks hold a net long position in Japanese assets). Japanese financial sector index (taken from Datastream) and the net intero¢ce accounts of foreign banks in Japan. The aggregate net intero¢ce accounts of foreign banks in Japan are measured as the asset minus liabilities intero¢ce components (available from Bank of Japan), expressed as a percentage of total financial assets of those banks. Over our sample period, the correlation coe¢cient between the two series is 87.23%.
